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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is poured over to this Court under the 
Judicial Code, specifically §78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. However, no Notice of Appeal has been filed and 
Appellee contends this Court has not acquired jurisdiction since 
more than thirty (30) days has elapsed since the filing of a final 
order. 
An ambiguous Notice of Appeal states: "The above-
entitled matter is appealed to the Court of Appeals in the form of 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus." (See Appendix A-l) 
The ambiguity was taken from the Notice of Appeal with 
the filing of a Docketing Statement (Appendix A-2). The Docketing 
Statement makes it clear the matter is not before the Court on 
appeal. The document is designated: "Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus to Judge David L. Mower, Sixth District Court for Sevier 
County." 
The Docketing Statement further uses the following 
language: 
We appreciate Mr. Butler's raising the 
question as to whether this appeal should be 
handled as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
and/or Appeal of Right. We address this 
issue first in this document. We believe 
this should be handled as Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus for the following reasons:... 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Identification of Parties 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Leonard Shyrl Brown and Ila 
Dell Brown are husband and wife and appearing Pro Se. 
Quinn Christensen is the Defendant and Appellee and is 
appearing through Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen, Mclff & Chamberlain, his 
attorneys. 
Issues 
1. Whether this Appellant Court acquired jurisdiction when 
Appellants failed to file a Notice of Appeal in 
compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
2. Whether or not a valid judgment of a court of general 
jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is a question of law. The case 
is here on the granting of a Summary Judgment. (Wineaar vs. 
Froerer Corporation, 813 P2d 104, 107 [Utah 1991]). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS 
United States Constitution, Article III, §§2, 3. 
26 USCS, §7402, Jurisdiction of District Courts. 
28 USCS, §125, Organization of Courts. 
28 USCS, §1332, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
Statutes of the State of Utah 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
§78-2a-3(2)(k) 
§78-27-56 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Rule 3, Rule 3(d), Rule 4, Rule 29, Rule 29(b)(12), Rule 33. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
In this case Appellants ask for a Decree Quieting Title 
in their favor and against Appellee on a certain parcel of real 
property located in Sevier County, Utah. 
Appellee had acquired title at a supervised Court-
ordered sale pursuant to judgment against Appellants who were 
designated as the Defendants in an action entitled, "United States 
of America, Plaintiff, vs. L. Shyrl Brown and Ila Dell Brown, 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, Civil No. 89C-143J." 
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Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below 
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Appellants filed separate motions seeking (1) to amend their 
Complaint; (2) a summary judgment; and (3) for "status quo". 
On June 8, 1994 the District Court entered an Order on 
the various motions: (1) authorizing amendment of the Complaint; 
(2) granting Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs (Appellants); (3) 
denying Appellants1 Motions for (a) status quo; and (b) summary 
judgment; and (4) vacating "common law lien". 
Appellants thereafter filed "Notice of Appeal" in the 
form of a "Petition for Writ of Mandamus" on the 14th day of June, 
1994 and had the notice served upon Judge David L. Mower (Appendix 
A-l). Thereafter, a Docketing Statement clarifying their actions 
in these proceedings was certified to have been mailed on the 2nd 
day of July, 1994. (Appendix A-2) 
The Supreme Court poured over this case to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellee observed notices of a Federal Marshal's 
sale of real property owned by the Appellants in Richfield, Sevier 
County, State of Utah. (R.23) 
2. On the 16th day of September, 1993, he attended the 
public sale and did bid the sum of $5000 for the described property 
which was the highest and best bid received. (R.24) 
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3. Appellee requested that the Deputy Marshal 
conducting the sale show his authority to conduct the sale. He was 
furnished a certified copy of a Judgment, Order of Foreclosure and 
Order of Sale executed by Bruce S. Jenkins, United States District 
Judge for the District of Utah, Central Division (R.24 and R.27, 
28) a copy of which Judgment, Order of Foreclosure and Order of 
Sale is attached as Appendix A-3. 
4. Appellee paid the $5000 consideration to the office 
of the United States Marshal and received a receipt therefor. 
(R.32) A copy of the receipt is attached as Appendix A-4. 
5. The United States Marshal did deliver to Appellee 
a Certificate of Purchase for the property described (R.34) which 
is attached as Appendix A-5 and by which he was advised that the 
sale would become absolute after a period of six (6) months unless 
redeemed. 
6. The property was not redeemed on or before the 16th 
of March, 1994. (R.24) 
7. On the 26th day of March, 1994, the United States 
Marshal issued to Appellee a United States Marshalfs Deed (R.37) 
conveying the entire interest of Plaintiffs in the real property 
described and at issue in these proceedings, which deed was 
recorded April 5, 1994 in Book 286, Page 68 of the records of 
Sevier County, Utah, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A-6. 
8. On the 27th day of April, 1994, Appellants served 
this Appellee with a Complaint seeking to quiet title and 
collaterally attacking the federal judgment and slandering title 
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to other property of Appellee, all of which required the Appellee 
to incur attorney fees and costs as well as personal expense in 
defending this pro se action. (R.l-5) 
9. Appellants did file a separate document identified 
as a pleading in this case and entitled, "common law commercial 
lien" which lien identified other property owned by Appellee in 
Sevier County, Utah, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 
A-7, having been filed in evidence on the 24th day of May, 1994. 
The "common law commercial lien" prepared and filed by 
Appellants listed other properties owned by Appellee, Quinn 
Christensen, in the County of Sevier. It slandered the title of 
all of Christensen»s property by describing the property 
specifically and then stating: "We seek a judgment against 
Christensen for $1000 per day for each day we are denied property 
rights and estimate the value in good faith." 
The document further stated: "This lien is attached to 
the above-described property in anticipation of a judgment to be 
secured by demandants from the Sixth District Court of Sevier 
County, State of Utah, Brown, et al. vs. Christensen, Civil No. 
940600108QT..." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts relied upon in support of Appellee's Motion 
for Summary Judgment were uncontroverted. 
Appellee acquired title to the real property at issue 
by reason of a Judgment, Order of Foreclosure and Order of Sale 
issued in an action by the United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. 
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L. Shyrl Brown and Ila Dell Brown, Defendants. 
The Federal District Court is a Court of general 
jurisdiction for the District of Utah and had personal jurisdiction 
over both Defendants and jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
the action. 
The Appellants did not in any way challenge directly the 
judgment decision and order of sale of the property issued by the 
Federal District Court but do now seek to challenge the judgment 
by collateral attack and the filing of a quiet title action. A 
judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and 
the subject matter is not subject to collateral attack. 
Since Appellants1 action and this Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ is frivolous and intended to harass Appellee, 
Appellee is entitled to an order dismissing the appeal or the 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ with an order that Appellee be 
reimbursed for costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
AND FOR THAT REASON THIS COURT IS WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION. 
An ambiguous document filed by Appellants entitled, 
"Notice of Appeal" states: "The above-entitled matter is appealed 
to the Court of Appeals in the form of Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus." (See Appendix A-l) 
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The ambiguity was taken from the Notice of Appeal with 
the filing of a Docketing Statement (Appendix A-2). The Docketing 
Statement makes it clear the matter is not before the Court on 
appeal. 
The document is designated "Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus to Judge David L. Mower, Sixth District Court for Sevier 
County." 
The Docketing Statement further uses the following 
language: 
We appreciate Mr. Butler's raising the 
question as to whether this appeal should be 
handled as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
and/or Appeal of Right. We address this 
issue first in this document. We believe 
this should be handled as Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus for the following reasons:... 
The Appellants were also required to designate on the 
face of their brief a priority of argument as required by Rule 29 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Appellants 
designated a priority of 12. Rule 29(b)(12) designates the 
proceedings as: 
(12) Original Writ proceedings. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide: 
An appeal may be taken from a district...to 
the Appellate Court with jurisdiction over 
the appeal from all final orders and 
judgment...by filing a Notice of Appeal with 
the Clerk of the trial court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4. 
Rule 4 provides: 
The filing shall be within 30 days from the 
date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
Rule 3 (d) also provides for the content of notice on 
appeal: 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice 
of appeal shall specify the party or parties 
taking the appeal; shall designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed 
from; shall designate the court from which 
the appeal is taken; and shall designate the 
court to which the appeal is taken. 
The total notice given in the instrument filed by 
Appellants is: 
Please take notice, that the above-entitled 
matter is appealed to the Court of Appeals 
in the form of a Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus. 
The foregoing does in no way designate the judgment or 
order or part thereof, appealed from. The notice requests relief 
"in the form of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus." 
It has been uniformly held that without notice of appeal 
being given, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. (Yost vs. State. 640 P2d 1044 [Utah 1981]) 
The following cases hold the Supreme Court cannot take 
jurisdiction over an appeal which is not timely brought before it; 
and an untimely appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
(Burgers vs. Maiben, 652 P2d 1320 [Utah 1982]; Bowen vs. Riverton 
City. 656 P2d 434 [Utah 1982]; Nielson vs. Stoker, 669 P2d 390 
[Utah 1983]). 
Since the question of jurisdiction of a court can be 
raised at any time or raised upon a court's own motion, these 
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proceedings should be dismissed with an award to Appellee for an 
action frivolously brought, contrary to Rule 33, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, which also provides for costs and 
expenses in case of an action brought frivolously or in bad faith. 
POINT II 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
APPELLEE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED. 
A) JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH WAS ENTITLED TO 
FULL CREDIT SINCE IT IS A COURT OF 
GENERAL JURISDICTION AND HAD 
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND 
SUBJECT MATTER. 
B) THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT CANNOT BE 
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. 
A) JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH WAS ENTITLED 
TO FULL CREDIT SINCE IT IS A COURT OF GENERAL 
JURISDICTION AND HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE 
PARTIES AND SUBJECT MATTER. 
The Federal District Court of the State of Utah was 
created by the United States of America pursuant to Article III of 
the United States Constitution. The Court was specifically 
established by the use of the following language: 
Section 1. The judicial power of the United 
States shall be vested in the Supreme Court 
and such inferior courts as Congress may, 
from time to time, ordain and establish. 
Section 2. The judicial power shall extend 
to all cases in law and equity. . . 
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Pursuant to the Code of Laws of the United States of 
America, Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. §1332 sets 
forth: 
The District Court shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions... 
The Federal District Court granting the judgment and 
order against Appellants was organized pursuant to 28 USCS, §125: 
"Utah constitutes one judicial district comprising two divisions.11 
In addition to the foregoing general powers, the Federal 
District Court was granted specific jurisdiction over the 
enforcement of Internal Revenue laws by §26, USCS 7402, entitled 
Jurisdiction of District Courts: 
(a) To issue orders, processes and judgments. 
The district courts of the United States at 
the instance of the United States shall have 
such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil 
actions, writs and orders of injunction and 
of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, 
and such other orders and processes, and to 
render such judgments and decrees as may be 
necessary or appropriate for the enforcement 
of the internal revenue laws. The remedies 
hereby provided are in addition to and not 
exclusive of any and all other remedies of 
the United States in such courts or otherwise 
to enforce such laws. 
The foregoing citations are to establish the fact that 
the United States Federal District Court with Judge Bruce Jenkins 
presiding, did have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the 
parties. The judgment was issued for the collection of income 
taxes. Further, the Federal District Court did have the authority 
to issue orders, processes and judgments necessary to collect the 
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judgment and, in addition, had general authority to adjudicate 
interests as between the Defendants in real property and to issue 
such supervised orders of sale or execution as were required. 
The Judgment and Order of Sale of property has not been 
directly challenged by Appellants. Appellants argue the judgment 
was not valid against them basically because it was oppressive and 
cite many federal cases which do not appear to be relevant. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the Defendants 
(Appellants herein) do not, by affidavit or otherwise, challenge 
jurisdiction of the Federal Court and do acknowledge they appeared 
and participated in the proceedings. A certified copy of the 
federal judgment (R.27,28, See Appendix A-3) recites: 
This matter came on for trial before the 
United States District Judge, Bruce S. 
Jenkins, on February 4 and 5, 1991 with Kirk 
C. Lusty and John Frickel representing the 
United States and L. Shryl Brown and I la Dell 
Brown appearing pro se. 
The Federal Court did enter a specific order with regard 
to the judgment granted and the foreclosure of the Federal Tax 
Liens on the real property which was owned by one or both of the 
Defendants. 
As seen from the Judgment and Order of Sale issued, the 
District Court supervised an Order of Execution over the subject 
property. 
A court of general jurisdiction has the inherent power 
to enforce its orders. 
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B) THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. 
Appellants have not sought to attack the judgment 
granted by the Federal District Court by appeal or by motion but 
now seek to attack it collaterally by alleging they can relitigate 
the matter in a separate court by filing a quiet title action. 
The uniform rule adopted unanimously throughout the 
United States is that a judgment rendered by a Court having 
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, "is not open 
to contradiction or impeachment" by collateral attack. (See 49 
CJS, §401, Collateral Attack. and the various state citations 
therein.) 
The Utah case of Intermill vs. Nash. 75 P2d 157 (1938), 
reviewed the question of collateral attack. The Court first 
defined the term by stating: 
The term "collateral attack" means the 
questioning of the validity of a judgment in 
a collateral proceeding; that is, a 
proceeding other than the one in which the 
judgment is entered, and which is not 
brought, instituted or maintained for the 
express purpose of modifying, setting aside, 
cancelling or enjoining the execution of a 
judgment. 
The Court then stated: 
On collateral attack the invalidity of the 
judgment must appear upon the face of the 
record. A judgment that is voidable cannot 
be attacked collaterally. 
And further stated: 
Any question, therefore, as to jurisdiction, 
or as to the validity of the judgment, which 
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does not show upon the face of the record 
must be raised and brought to the attention 
of the court by appropriate pleadings• 
Errors in the judgment, or judgments 
erroneously entered, where the court had 
jurisdiction of the res and of the parties, 
can only be reviewed or corrected by motion 
in that proceeding or by appeal. 
Intermill. supra, did further hold that in collateral 
proceedings the question of voidability must be raised as the 
burden of the party asserting it and stated: 
If it (record) is silent, then the 
presumption follows that what ought to have 
been done was not only done, but rightly 
done. In a collateral attack, the omission 
to affirm the jurisdictional fact upon the 
record will be supplied by the presumption 
that the court acted with due authority, and 
its judgment will be valid as though any fact 
necessary to jurisdiction affirmatively 
appeared. (Utah cases cited omitted.) 
The doctrine of Intermill, supra, was reaffirmed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Bawden vs. Pearce, 414 P2d 578 
(1966) which was a matter filed by landowners brought to enjoin 
the planning commission, its members and Director of Building 
Inspection Department from issuing further permits for the 
construction of a shopping center. The moving parties were 
Plaintiffs in a prior action where a judgment was granted requiring 
a Writ be issued directing the Salt Lake County Commission and its 
members, the Salt Lake Planning Commission and its members, and the 
Chief Building Inspector of Salt Lake County to consider and 
process the application for construction. 
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The Court dismissed the second action stating: "The 
relief sought by Appellants herein, if granted, would void that 
judgment in a collateral proceeding. This cannot be done.11 It 
cited Intermill, supra. 
The same principle set forth in Intermill was again 
reviewed and approved in Olsen vs. Board of Education of the 
Granite School District. 571 P2d 1336 (Utah 1977). 
The Supreme Court of Utah, through Justice Hall stated: 
The principles of res adjudicata apply to judgments 
in condemnation proceedings as to matters 
therein litigated. Just as the rules 
governing the application of the doctrine of 
res adjudicata to judgments generally, the parties 
hereto are precluded as to all matters that 
were put in issue or might have been put in 
issue, or were necessarily implied in the 
decision...The doctrine renders a final 
judgment, on the merits, by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon the 
parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation 
of the same issues. 
[4] The general rule of law is that a 
judgment may not be drawn in question in a 
collateral proceeding and an attack upon a 
judgment is regarded as collateral if made 
when the judgment is offered as the basis of 
a claim in a subsequent proceedings. 
[5] A judgment may not be impeached in 
collateral proceedings, by a party or privy 
to it, for fraud, collusion, or false 
testimony. This rule is particularly 
applicable when the fraud was actually tried 
in the proceedings or so involved that it 
might have been tried. 
Since the original judgment and order was from a Federal 
District Court, it should be noted that in the case of Edmonston 
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vs. Sisk, (1946) CA 10, Okla. (156 F2d 300), the Court held: 
The truth of a Writ of Execution cannot be 
inquired into collaterally, but only upon 
motion to set it aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has incurred attorney fees, expenses and 
costs in this action which can only be deemed as an action brought 
in bad faith and governed by §78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, or was frivolously brought contrary to Rule 33, URAP. 
Since the Appellants are representing themselves, they 
are held to the same standards as though they were qualified 
attorneys and required to recognize their action as ill-conceived. 
They are required to recognize that the District Court below had 
no jurisdiction to review a federal judgment entitled to full faith 
and credit. They are required to recognize that they have no right 
or authority to slander the title to other real property owned by 
the Appellee by filing what they designate as a "common law lien." 
They are also required to recognize that this Court has no 
jurisdiction over this "appeal" because of their failure to file 
a Notice of Appeal. 
They are further required to know that their slanderous 
statements concerning Judge David L. Mower in their request for an 
extraordinary writ from this Court directing him to make decisions 
contrary to law, are not only inappropriate but without merit. 
For the reasons stated in this brief, the Appellee 
requests the appeal of Appellants be dismissed and that he be 
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granted his costs and expenses incurred. In the event this Court 
elects to review matters here on appeal, Appellee requests that the 
final orders heretofore entered by David L. Mower, District Judge, 
be affirmed and Appellee be awarded his costs and expenses incurred 
in these proceedings. 
The Affidavit of Tex R. Olsen concerning costs and 
expenses incurred in these proceedings is attached as Appendix A-
8 for the consideration of the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
By ^CZ^^^T^ 
Tex R. Olsen 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee were mailed to Leonard Shyrl Browm, Appellant, 
490 North 100 West, Richfield, Utah (84702) and four (4) copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were also mailed to Ila Dell Brown, 
Appellant, 490 North 100 West, Richfield, Utah (84701) by U. S. 
Regular Mail, postage prepaid, on this fo day of December, 1994. 
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APPENDIX 
TH DISTRICT COURT 
SEV1 
Leonard Shyrl Brown 
Ila Dell Brown 
490 North 100 West 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
801-896-4864 
CLERK- "M--
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Leonard Shyrl Brown, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
Quinn Christensen, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 940600108QT 
Judge David L. Mower 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, the above entitled matter is appealed 
to the Court of Appeals in the form of Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus. 
DATED this / T day of June, 1994. 
£T, $IMJKJ 
Leonard Shyr Ila D. Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I mailed a copy of this Notice to Tex R. Olsen, 
Attorney, P. O. Box^100, Richfield, Utah, postage prepaid, U.S. 
Mail, on this /^ day of June, 1994. 
7 .. v l^^u^y 
Leonard Shyrl Brown 
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Leonard Shyrl Brown 
Ila Dell Brown 
490 North 100 West 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
801-896-4864 
in person 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Leonard Shyrl Brown and Ila : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Dell Brown, 
: Subject to Assignment to 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, the Court of Appeals 
v Appellate Court No. 940320 
Quinn Christensen, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER, SIXTH 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SEVIER COUNTY. 
We appreciate Mr. Butler's raising the question as to 
whether this appeal should be handled as a Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus or and appeal of right? We address this issue first 
in this document. We believe this should be handled as a 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS for the following reasons: 
1. The record decisions of Judge Mower are false, 
presumptive and hopelessly inadequate for appeal. We believe 
the record decisions and orders could not be that bad unless 
there was actual bias and prejudice on the part of the judge. 
The false statements must be corrected. The presumptions must 
be voided and replaced with fact and law. The court decisions 
must include decisions on all issues of applicable law. These 
things are necessary in the interest of justice 
a. Judge Mower recognized our request to amend our 
APPENDIX A-2 
the allegations, (1) lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court 
over our persons, (2) lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court 
over the real property owned by Ila Brown and (3) there is 
no law making Leonard LIABLE for any federal tax. Judge Mower's 
order states at p. 5, 
1. Plaintiffs1 Motion to amend their Complaint and 
specifically allege that the identified Marshal's Sale 
of Plaintiffs property was a "judicially-supervised sale" 
is hereby granted and considered in making the orders 
hereinafter following. 
The Order bears no relationship to our position whatsoever. 
The Order is an outright lie. We allege lack of jurisdiction 
of the foreign jurisdiction court over our persons, over Ila's 
real property and over subject matter. We proved lack of 
jurisdiction in the lower court by our uncontested Memoranda. 
We never alleged the sale was a "judicially-supervised sale." 
We proved the alleged sale was in direct violation of the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act and in direct violation of several parts 
of Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the remainder 
of the order was "granted and considered in making the orders" 
and because the statement in #1 quoted above is absolutely false 
and fraudulent the remainder of Judge Mower1 order is false 
and fraudulent. The record must be corrected and the fraud 
removed for appeal because of the higher presumption that the 
lower court record is correct. 
b. Judge Mower refers to Ila's property as "Plaintiffs1 
property." That is the second absolute lie in the same sentence 
we quote in #a above. Ila is the sole owner of the real property 
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years old. The deed is not difficult to read and is uncontested. 
If there was an objection to the deed we could have verified 
it in Sevier County Recorder's Office only a short distance 
from the court room in the same building. Judge Mower should 
be ordered to state clearly and in detail his (alleged) authority 
and rationale for destroying Ilafs recorded deed and rights 
to the real property. 
c. There is an undecided MOTION to strike the foreign 
judgment for failure to pay the filing fee (Utah Codey 
21-1-5(1 0) ) pending before Judge Mower. He should be ordered 
to decide the issue. 
d. Judge Mower refused to NOTICE Ilafs deed to her 
property recorded in 1972. We believe this to be a most 
important fact and was never considered. The record is silent 
on that issue. 
e. Judge Mower refused to allow us to mount what he 
called a "collateral" attack on the foreign judgment. Our attack 
on the foreign judgment is based on violations of law, fraud, 
lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law in the 
foreign jurisdiction court. He therefore ruled in direct 
opposition to precedent established by this court and the Court 
of Appeals. (See Data Management Systems v EDP Corp, 709 P2d 
377 (Utah 1985); Holm v Smilowitz, 840 P2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 
1992); Intermill v Nashy 75 P2d 157, 160 (Utah 1938)) Intermill 
was the only case cited by Judge Mower. The court should ORDER 
the lower court hear and decide our numerous attacks on the 
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and barriers to granting FULL FAITH AND CREDIT in Utah to the 
foreign judgment. 
f. Our quiet title action is based almost entirely 
on law. We have attached a number of laws Judge Mower refused 
to decide to our Petition. Even this list is not exhaustive. 
Judge Mower refused to NOTICE and DECIDE the law, creating 
overwhelming bias and prejudice against Plaintiffs. If there 
is to be justice in this matter, we believe this court must 
ORDER Judge Mower to specifically NOTICE and DECIDE THE LAWS. 
Only then will the lower court record be perfected for appeal. 
g. We understand this court WILL NOT hear appeals unless 
the issues appealed are raised and DECIDED in the lower court. 
We have done and are doing everything we possibly can to make 
certain the record proves we tried to raise the numerous issues 
of law in the lower court while demanding decisions on these 
same issues of law. We understand it is the duty of Judge Mower 
to decide the issues of law without bias or prejudice against 
Plaintiffs. A part of the record is this Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus to ORDER Judge Mower to DECIDE the laws presented. 
If the courts will not NOTICE and DECIDE the issues of law we 
raise, our civil action is hopelessly prejudiced. 
h. The record is so bad that we ask this court to take 
NOTICE that Judge Mower has refused to place the alleged judgment 
of the U.S. District Court in that class of judgments which 
can not be directly enforced by the foreign jurisdiction but 
which must seek FULL FAITH AND CREDIT for enforcement by a Utah 
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i. We have filed our NOTICE OF DEFAULT with the court. 
More than ten (10) days have expired after Judge Mower was 
personally served a copy of our Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 
No objections or counter argument have been filed to this date 
to our knowledge by either Judge Mower or interested party Quinn 
Christensen. Therefore, the court should grant our demanded 
relief. 
j. Grounds for our Petition for Writ of Mandamus are 
more fully set down in our Petition. 
2. This Petition for Writ of Mandamus is absolutely 
necessary to correct the lower court record and to perfect the 
record for appeal, if necessary. 
3. It appears this case may create considerable precedent. 
We can not find any case closely related to the fact or law 
in this civil action. We presume the reason is that other 
foreign judgments have followed the prescribed procedure at 
law for gaining full faith and credit and enforced according 
to the laws of Utah. We therefore urge the court to aid us 
by Mandamus in correcting the lower court record and in 
perfecting the case for appeal, if necessary. 
4. On the other hand, we firmly believe that if Judge 
Mower is ORDERED by this court to NOTICE and DECIDE the issues 
of law we raise, without prejudice to Plaintiffs, he will reverse 
his own decision bringing a quick end to the quiet title action 
without the extensive expenditure of time, money and energy 
which would be required in an appeal of right. 
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justice, decide the law, correct the record and perfect the 
lower court record. 
6. We can not find a court which will protect Ila's bights 
to her property and our rights to personal property thereih. 
Numerous people have entered and exited Ilafs property. We 
have definite indications that personal property has been Stolen 
from the building. We demand protection of our property. We 
DEMAND THAT THIS COURT ACT IMMEDIATELY TO PROTECT OUR PROPERTY 
PENDING A FINAL DECISION ON THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY. We 
demand immediate action. 
THEREFORE, for the above reasons or any of them, this appeal 
should be considered as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and 
the court should grand the relief we demand. 
We now complete the outline docketing statement even though 
we consider it irrelevant for we understand the Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus requires no special form. 
T. Date of entry of judgment June 15, 1994. 
2. The court has not yet ruled on prejudgment motions, 
a. Amendment of judgment - May 31, 1994. b. Stay - May 31, 
1994. (Thus, our property and rights to property ate 
unprotected, c. Strike tha foreign judgment for failure to 
pay the filing fee - Juxie 3* 1994. d. Analysis of Intermill 
v Nash - June 6, 1994. Our objections to the Order were filed 
June 17, 1994. 
3. Rule 54(b) ORCP appears to not apply. The only decision 
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foreign judgment or grounds of law, fraud, lack of jurisdiction 
or lack of due process of law. (See p.3, #1(e)) The purpose 
of this Petition is to correct and perfect the record of the 
lower court. 
4. Notice of appeal was filed June 14, 1994. 
5. This court has jurisdiction under Utah Codef 78-2-2(2), 
extraordinary writs. 
6. Trial court. Sixth District Court of Sevier County, 
Judge David L. Mower, presiding. 
7. Statement of facts and questions in on pages 1-5 above. 
8. Review see #3 immediately above. In addition this 
court should consider that: (1) Notice of appeal was filed on 
June 14, 1994. (2) Judge Mower was personally served a copy 
and a copy of petition for Writ of Mandamus on June 14, 1994. 
(3) Judge Mower's judgment was filed June 15, 1994 according 
to the copy sent to us by this court. Therefore, jurisdiction 
had transferred to the higher court prior to the filing of Judge 
Mower's Order. Therefore, the ORDER is invalid in want of 
jurisdiction. 
9. The court should take careysee that all applicable 
laws are noticed and decided, that the lower court record is 
corrected and that the lower record is perfected for appeal. 
The court should also take care that we are granted immediate 
relief and that our property is protected from invasion, trespass 
theft or other unlawful acts. This case may become important 
precedent for future cases and the court should take care that 
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the record is true and correct and all appropriate laws are 
noticed and decided according to law. 
10. Determinative law. Determinative law is cited in 
our petition but is not necessarily exhaustive. Determinative 
cases for purposes of this petition are found on p. 3, 1(e) 
above. 
11 . None. 
12. None. 
Leonard Shyrl Brown 
^£v ZT/^W^o^ 
Ila D. Brown 
Plaintiffs, Appellants. 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I certify I mailed a copy of this document to Judge David L. 
Mower, Sevier County Courthouse, 250 South Main, Richfield, 
Utah 84701 and to Tex R. Olsen, P.O. Box 100, Richfield, Utah 
84701, postage prepaid, U. S. Mail, on this J?- day of July, 
1994. 
Leonard Shyrl Brown 
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DEE V. BENSON (0289) 
United States Attorney 
Room 466, U.S. Courthouse 
350 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 524-5682 
KIRK C. LUSTY 
Trial Attorney, Tax Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 683 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
Telephone: (202) 307-6531 
"ICO'NUWTEB STATES DISTRICT 
COIJST. ©STRICT OF UT4* 
thereby certify thai itv»ar >exed 
and correct copy or the original on We In 
ATTEST: MAflKUS & ZMMER 
Ctorfc. U.S. District Court 
DtaMctartftft 
^ • v C 
,...w • W i i M M w i * 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v* 
L. SHYRL BROWN, et al., 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 89C-143J 
JUDGMENT, ORDER OF 
FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE 
This matter came for trial before United States District 
Judge Bruce s. Jenkins on February 4 and 5, 1991 with Kirk C. 
Lusty and John Pirkle representing the United states and L. Shyrl 
Brown and Ila Dell Brown appearing pro i;e. The Court previously 
entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order. Based on the 
Memorandum Opinion and Order judgment is entered as follows: 
1. Against L* Shyrl Brown and in favor of the United States 
in the sum of $190,404.89, plus interest and statutory additions 
as provided by law. 
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2. Foreclosing the Federal tax liens on the real property 
located at 46 west 10o North, Richfield, Utah. The legal 
description of that property is: 
Coma, at a point 13.5 ft. E of SW Cor of Lot 1, Block 
45, Plat "A", Richfield City survey, N 48.9 ft., E 16 
ft 8 in. S 48.9 ft., w 16 Ft. 8 in., to beg. containing 
approximately &XB square feet, situated in the 
Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 
25, Township 23 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
3. That the United states Marshal sell the real property 
identified in paragraph 2 and distribute the proceeds as follows: 
(a) First, to the costs of such sale; 
(b) Second, to the costs of this action; 
(c) Third, one-half to defendant Ila Dell Brown and 
one-half to the United States to be applied to the federal 
tax liabilities set forth in paragraph 1? and 
(d) Any remaining sum to defendant L. Shyrl Brown. 
4. This Order of Sale shall act as a Writ of Execution. 
Dated this & y day of & g ^ > V - > , 1991. 
B5f THE COURT 
BRUCE S. Jl 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that service of the foregoing 
(proposed) JUDGMENT, ORDER OF FORECLOSURE AND.ORDER OF SALE has 
this __ V?.;,-), day of September, 1991 been made on opposing parties 
by mailing a true and correct copy to the following: 
L. Shyrl Brown 
Ila Dell Brown 
180 North 100 East 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
u, KIRK C. LUSTY Trial Attorney,('Tax Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 683 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.c 20044 
Telephone: (202) 307-6531 
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w*»»»wv> u » u i c j inuf J/uuia . JC/ vu.c 
RECEIPT 
District of. £x 
1. RECEIVED OF: 2. DATE 
Q l - N U - ^ 
3. COURT/CASE NUMBER OR PURPOSE OF COLLECTION 4. AMOUNT 
Of^VN ^ C N T - f X g N T N 
Y^ \^ ciX\C\'e^e E-& Y^^V^^^ \ 
^ TOTAL S g ^ g b g ^ . C ^ l N 
(Note: if check is received in mail and is for process, place in USM-286 
folder) 
COPY I-REMITTER 
6.VRECEIVED BY (U.S. Marshals Service Official) 
FORM USM-303 (Rev. 2/92) 
r * 
-r<jJO^ 
11 t A i ->• - » ' j 
/ . g6fi- n^*71^ 
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U.S. Department of Justice 
United States Marshals Service 
CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE 
I. 
&mi?ft States of Amsrira , 
District of Utah 
Eugene H. Davis 
89-C-143J 
United States of America 
ss:
 vs. 
L. Shyrl Brown, et al., 
, United States Marshal of the 
>aid
 u M , District of Utah do herel judgment ureter or Foreclosure 
:ertain W«txetf^B«©«»w« issued out of and under the seal of the United States 
For said 
3f 
District of Utah 
, do hereby certify that by virtue of a 
D i . g f r i r f Court 
24th day 
September 
, on the 
, A.D. 19 9 1 , in favor of the United States of America 
, Plaintiff 
and against L« Shyrl Brown and I l a Dell Brown 
to me directed and delivered, I did, on the 
levy upon, and did, on this the 
12th 
16th 
day of 
day of 
August 
September 
, Defendant 
, A.D. 19 93 
, A.D. 19 93 
sell at public sale (in the manner provided by law, and after duly advertising the same, according to the 
Statute in such case made and provided), to Quinn Chris t iensen 
of Central Valley 
County of State of u t a h 
Qf Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($5.000,00) 
, in the 
for the sum 
, dollars, 
he being the highest and best bidder, and that being the highest sum bid for the same, at said sale, 
all the right, title, and interest of the said Defendant L, Shyrl Rrnun and Tia noii n-mwn 
said of which t hey w erg seized or possessed on the 
time afterwards, of, in, and to all the following-described land situated in the 
, date of the said levy, or at any 
Utah 
County of, Sevier Sta te of 
to wit: Comm« a t a point 13.5 f t , E of SW Cor of Lot 
1, Block 45, P la t "A", Richfield City Survey. N 48.9 f t . . E 16 f t 8 i n . S 48.9 f t . r 
W 16 f t . 8 i n . , to beg, containine approximately 818 square fepr, g-frnat-Prl ^ *h* 
Northwest quarter of the Southwest quar ter of Section 25. Township 23 South. Range 3 
West, Sa l t Lake Base and Meridian, 
APPENDIX AS 
Form USM-160 
together with the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
Snb 3 bo furtfjer ctrtifp, that the purchase money so bidden at said sale has been paid to me, and that 
the said sale will become absolute, and that the said purchaser or his assigns, will be entitled to 
a deed of conveyance of the said land on the 16th day of March, 1994 
unless the same shall be sooner redeemed, according to the Statute in such case made and provided. 
Gibtn unber mp fjanb, this 27th
 d a y o f September Z>&.D. 1993 
For the. .District of. Utah 
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UNITED STATES MARSHAL'S DEED ^w^* 
t E l j f e 3 f a b e i l t U r e , is made and entered into t h i s Z ^ d a y nf M a r c h 
between the United States Marshal for the District of Utah __c-——, [hereinafter referred ti 
ari'Jte-nseH , 
"United States Marshal"] in his official capacity, and Quinn ^frr-£*rt4ens<aa
 nf the Central Vallev *J 
County of Sevier
 a n d 
of the County of 
Witllt&itti), that on this 24thj a y nf September , 1 9 J 1 , in the United States O 
for the District of Utah
 t 
Plaintiff, recovered a judgment against L. Shyrl Brown and I l a Dell Brown __ 
Defendant, in the amount of S _ plus costs of suit in the amount of S. : 
That on the. 24th
 H a y n f September _ _ , I9J2JL, the United States District Court foi 
District nf Utah ^
 i s g u e d a ^ ^ y Judgment, Order of Fore- directing the Un 
c losure and Order of Sale 
States Marshal to collect that judgment; 
That on 4 t h day of October ^ 19.iL, the United States Marshal did levy the s 
Writ upon a certain tract or parcel, hereinafter described; 
That the same tract or parcel of land was first advertised for sale by the United States Marshal 3ccor 
to law, then sold at a public sale at Richfielfl? Utah _ 
Quinn Ghrijti&imen
 % who bid the highest and 
bid in the amount of S 5,000.00 _ . 
Jloto therefore, I, Eugene H. Davis , United States Mar 
by virtue of my office and according to law, iii consideration of S 5,000.00 j n hand paid to me 
Quinn Chris t iensen . _ ^
 g n m t f b a r g a i n ^ d s e l l ^ , 
title, interest and claim which L. Shyrl Brown and I l a Dell Brown 
Defendant, had in the following tract or parcel of land: 
Comm. a t a point 13.5 f t . E of SW Cor of Lot 1, Block 45, P la t "A". Richfield C i t v . -
Survey, N 48.9 f t . , E 16 f t 8 i n . S 48.9 f t . , w 16 Ft-, ft -fn . , f* w ; containing—•— 
approximately 818 square f e e t , s i t u a t e d in the Northwest quar ter of the Southwest _ 
quar te r of Section 25. Township 23 South'. Range 3 West. Salt Lake Bagp and Mpr-fnMan .^ 
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Dorthy V. Henrie, Recorder Sevier County 
tEo 5)abE tinb tO Jfyoltl, together with npp.irtpnanppc thmtn m Quinn Christiensen 
and his/her heirs and assigns. 
3Jn lOPttnCSS Wf}tVtot, I have hereby set my hand and seal this .ZS^Bay nf March 
19. 94 
United States Marshal for the/District of Utfeh s ; £ ;_L. 
^ 5". ' i ? £ I -:»" 
District of _Utah 
Markus B. Zimmer 
Court of the United States for the 
, Clerk of the. Distr ict 
.District of _ _ 2 H S L 
do hereby certify, that Eugene H. Davis 
the United States Marshal for the District of Utah 
whom I recognize as the United States Marshal, this'day personally appeared before me and acknowledged 
he executed this Deed of Conveyance as the United States Marshal, for the uses and purposes stated therein. 
3 l l Wittltii WtyzXZOi, I have hereby set my hand 
affixed the Sea], of the _ District Court 
Court, atsfltf QtrtcRj-i--
, V V f) ^ ; 
in the Disifcdt nl A^tah
 t jhis 
••'• Salt Lake City 
.day of M a r c h .19. 
fin 
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Leonard Shyrl Brown and Ila Dell Brown 
490 North 100 West, Richfield, Utah 84701 
Demandants, 
vs 
Quinn Christensen, 155 South Old Hwy 89, 
Central Valley, Utah 84754 
Respondent. 
COMMON LAW 
COMMERCIAL LIEN 
SERVICE BY U.S. 
MAIL, CERTIFIED 
No. P 009 044 889 
AMOUNT OF LIEN - $1,000.00 per day 
This Common Law Commercial Lien is on all property owned or 
jointly owned by Respondent Quinn Christensen or in which he 
has rights, titles or interest within Sev.ier County, Utah, 
together with all buildings, structures, sheds, improvements, 
water, water rights, ditches, ditch rights, springs appurtenant 
to or belonging to the described property. 
Parcel 1. The Northeast quarter and the West Half of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 33, Township 23 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 240.0 acres. 
Parcel 2. Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Section 28, 
Township 23 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
and running thence West 20.0 chains; thence North 50.0 chains; 
thence East 20.0 chains; thence South 50.0 chains to beginning, 
containing 100.0 acres. 
Parcel 3. Commencing at the Northeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 4, Township 24 South, Range 2 West, SLB&M; 
and running thence South 20 chains, thence West 8 chains, thence 
North 1.05 chains, thence North 70° 30* West 12.70 chains, thence 
North 14.85 chains, thence East 20 chains to beginning. 
Serial No. 4-279-6 
Parcel 4. The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 33, Township 23 South, Range 2 West, SLB&M. Serial No. 
4-229-5 
Parcel 5. The East half dt the Southwest Quarter of Section 
33, Township 23 South, Rdnge 2 West SLB&M. Serial No. 4-229-
6 
This lien is attached to the above described property in 
anticipation of a judgment to be secured by Demandants from 
the Sixth District Court of Sevier County, State of Utah, Brown, 
et al. v Christensen, Civil No. 940600108 QT, which Demandants 
believe, in good faith, will be owned by Respondant. 
Notice is hereby given to the Respondant that Demandants files 
this Common Law Commercial Lien for the purpose of protecting 
and securing the equitable interest the Demandants have in said 
property. The cause for this action is as follows: Respondant 
did, on or about 04/22/94, file a Criminal Trespass Complaint 
with the Richfield City police. Officer V. Sickles, Richfield 
City police, informed Leonard Brown by telephone and later Ila 
280 
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and Leonard Brown in person that if we entered the building 
at 46 West 100 North, Richfield, Utah, we would be imprisoned. 
The property is owned by Ila Brown by recorded deed since 1972. 
Thus we have been unlawfully denied rights, possession, use 
comfort and enjoyment of the property. The above civil action 
is to quiet title in Ila Brown or in Leonard and Ila Brown. 
We seek a judgment against Christensen for $1,000.00 per day 
for each day we are denied property rights and estimate the 
value in good faith. 
The Respondantfs rights and Waiver of Rights: Under the U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment 7, the Respondant may file a "Suit at 
Common Law," to remove this Lien. Under Common Law rules the 
case must be tried before a Jury. No judge can act on a motion 
to Dismiss or vacate this Lien, which would come from Chancery 
or Equity, and any judge who does so, acts without jurisdiction 
and is immediately fully liable to Demandant for all damages 
requested herein. Said Jury Trial cannot allow Motions in Limine 
or Directed Verdicts, as they were not allowed under Common 
Law. In the event that the Respondant fails to challenge this 
Lien by filing a "Suit at Common Law," within ninety (90) days 
from the date of service of this Lien, this Lien shall become 
a perfected Lien. Should the Respondant file a "Suit at Common 
Law," the Jury shall have full power to sustain, modify or vacate 
this Lien. 
^MJ^J^^OJ 
DAraD: this 5th Day of May, 1994. 
Leonard Shy/1 Bro^#, Demandant Ila Dell Brown, Demandant 
AFFIDAVIT 
I, Leonard Shyrl Brown and I, Ila Dell Brown, being duly sworn 
on Oath affirm that all information and statements in the Common 
Law Lien and attached paper are true and correct, to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. All statements made herein are 
mad^ in good faith and in the interest of justice. j 
Leonard Sliyrl 
>j£d"i^£i^J 
Ila Dell Brown 
State of Utah 
County of Sevier ss 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
i> 
Notary 
Day of May, 1994, 
Public 
2 5 9 4 8 4 ^ 287 Entry No , DOOK *-7' •• 
RecordedMXl f f iA t _i^LPage-2att. 
Dorthy V. Henrie, Recorder Sevier CourtV 
Request of L- s- * ™ " Fee^g^L 
N6TA)FIY PUBLIC I 
Donna Greenhalgh 
310 South Main, Suit* 3oa 
Sal! Laka City. Utah 84101 
My Commtsslaa Ecptraa 
Au?o«t13,1t96 
fl^TE OF UTAH I 
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(MEMORANDUM OF COMMON LAW 
1. "The 'common law' is all the statutory and case law background of England and 
the American Colonies before the American Revolution. As distinguished from law created 
by enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises, with the body of those 
principles and rules of action, relating to the government and security of persons 
and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and custom of 
immemorial antiquity... particularly the ancient unwritten law of England." Black's 
Law Dictionary, 5th Edition. 1979. 
2. Common Law L1en: "One known to or granted by the common law, as distinguished 
from statutory law, equity, and maritime liens; It 1s the right extended to a person, 
to retain that which is 1n his possession, allegedly claimed by another, until the 
demand or charge of the person 1n possession 1s paid and satisfied. Whiteside v. 
Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., C C A . Colo., 101 F. 2nd 765, 769." Black's Law Dictionary 1bed. 
3. "A lien on property by operation of the common law. may have precedence of an 
existing mortgage." Drummand Carriege Co. v. Mills (1898). 74 N.W. 966, McMahon v. 
Lundln 58 N.W. 827, Carr v. Dial 19 S.E. 235. 
4. "In suits at common law, found in this clause, 1s used 1n contrad1st1ct1on of 
equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.... It 1s well known that in civil 
causes in courts of equity and admiralty juries do not Intervene When, therefore, 
we find that the amendment requires that the right to trial by jury shall be preserved. 
1n suits at common law. the natural conclusion 1s that this distinction was present 
1n the minds of the fraraers of the amendment. By 'common law' they meant what the 
Constitution denominated In the Third Article "law;' not merely suits... but suits 1n 
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined. In contradistinction to 
those where equitable rights alone were recognized.: Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 452. 
5. "It follows from the foregoing that every civil action provided by State Statute, 
not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction 1s a suit of common law, within the meaning 
of the Seventh Amendment, and that the U.S. Courts, 1f they assume jurisdiction in 
such an action at all, must afford a jury trial, even though this 1s contrary to the 
spirit and letter of the State Statute." Klever v. Seawall, 65 F. 393. 
6. "The courts of the United States are bound to recognize and enforce the common 
law. U.S. v. Marchant 25 U.S. 480, 12 Wheat, 480, 6 L.Ed. 700.. affirming U.S. v. 
White, Fed. Case No. 16,682.4 158." 4 Supreme Court Digest 676. 
7. "State judges may be found criminally liable for violation of civil rights. 
18 U.S.C.A. 242; 42 U.S.CA. 1983; Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S. Ct. 183, 449 U.S. 24, 
66 L. Ed. 2nd 185." 9 Supreme Court Digest 173. (1980) 
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APPENDIX A-7 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 940693-CA 
Priority No. 12 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
LEONARD SHYRL BROWN AND 
ILA DELL BROWN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs -
QUINN CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
AFFIDAVIT OF TEX R. OLSEN IN SUPPORT 
OF COSTS AND EXPENSES 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
TEX R. OLSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. He is the attorney for Defendant-Appellee, Quinn 
Christensen in these proceedings and has personal knowledge of 
costs and expenses incurred. 
2. Since the conclusion of the proceedings in the 
District Court, Appellee has incurred the following: 
Date Work Completed Hours 
11-23-94 Complete review of documents 
filed with Supreme Court by 
Brown and securing Court record; 
review of entire record; case 
review on questions of jurisdiction 
and collateral judgment 6 
APPENDIX A-8 
reaerai uisrricr courr; researcn 
concerning authority of United States 
of America through the Department of 
Internal Revenue to use Federal District 
Court; review of Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 4 
11-29/30-94 Writing brief on appeal for 
Appellee, including preparing 
Appendix, indexing the record 8 
Attorney fees charged Appellee 
at the rate of $100 per hour 
which is a reasonable rate for 
the work requested $2000.00 
Expenses Incurred: 
15 copies of Appellee's Brief 
printed; brief with appendix 
includes 43 pages at $3.00 
per page $ 129.00 
Anticipated Costs and Expenses: 
Oral argument and travel from 
Richfield to SLC and return, 330 
miles (8 hours) $ 800.00 
(330 @ .25 per mile) $ 82.50 
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES: $3011.15 
DATED this / day of December/ 1994. 
s£^ 
Tex R. Olsen 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, 
on this day and year first above written.
 /f ^ 
Notary Public 
Residing At: Richfield, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 7-10-95 
^aJBTOALMB^M 
WNORTHIOOeAST ' 
^CHHEtaUT »470t 
COMM. EXP. 7-10-95 
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